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Grid Valuation of Beef Carcass Quality: Market Power and Market Trends 
 
Abstract 
The fed cattle grid pricing system’s premium and discount incentive mechanism is 
investigated. Two issues are addressed: a) we investigate changes in the weekly market value of 
an animal’s carcass quality attributes as determined by the USDA-Agricultural Marketing 
Service (AMS) additive grid; and b) an evaluation of the effect of packer behavior on grid 
valuation of carcass quality attributes. 
  A pooled-cross sectional data set containing carcass information on 598 fed steers 
evaluated weekly on the AMS publically reported price grid (National Carcass Premiums and 
Discounts for Slaughter Steers and Heifers) was constructed for the years 2001 to 2008 (226,000 
observations). Thus individual animal carcass quality characteristics are held constant through 
time. 
 For the 598 animals included in this study, the empirical evidence suggests that: a) 
premiums and discounts associated with specific carcass quality attributes have been adjusting 
over time; b) during periods of packer cooperative behavior in the fed cattle market, the market 
value of carcass quality declined, on average, by $0.50 per hundred weight; and c) the average 
market value of an animal’s carcass quality, meeting industry quality standards, exhibited a 
positive trend during the study period. This implies the grid incentive mechanism strengthened 
during this period for those producers who produced fed cattle that met industry quality 




Grid Valuation of Beef Carcass Quality: Market Power and Market Trends 
 
Introduction:  
Published studies in the grid pricing literature have focused on numerous issues revolving around 
the economic incentive structure associated with marketing on a grid (see Fausti et al. 2010 for a 
discussion of this literature).  A subset of these studies has investigated how effective the grid 
premium and discount incentive mechanism has performed as an information transmission 
mechanism (e.g., Feuz 1999; Fausti and Qasmi 2002, Johnson and Ward 2005 and 2006; Fausti 
et al. 2014). To date, a long-run empirical study of grid premium and discount behavior has not 
be conducted for the post-MPR (Livestock Mandatory Price Reporting Act of 1999) era.  
 In addition, the empirical grid pricing literature has not addressed the issue of how 
market structure may influence the grid incentive mechanism.  The issue of packer market power 
in the slaughter cattle market has been a popular area of study for economists.  Empirical studies 
in this area have developed both long-run and short-run models to investigate packer market 
power in the meatpacking and fed cattle markets (e.g.,  Azzam and Anderson 1996; Ward 2010).  
 The issue of packer market power influencing fed cattle producer grid marketing 
decisions has been discussed in the theoretical (grid pricing) literature by Whitley (2002) and 
Fausti et al. (2013). No empirical investigation on whether oligopsony power influences grid 
premium and discount levels has appeared in the literature. Our objective is to investigate; a) 
long-run trends in the weekly market value of an animal’s carcass quality attributes to assess the 
evolution of the grid pricing structure as a market signaling mechanism in the post-MPR era, and 
b) the effect of packer behavior on grid valuation of carcass quality attributes using identified 
periods of packer cooperative versus non-cooperative behavior (Cai et al. 2011).  A linear mixed 
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modeling approach that encompasses both fixed and random effects is employed to identify 
factors that influence the market evaluation of carcass quality within a grid pricing mechanism.  
 
Literature Review: 
The two fields of literature associated with this study are: a) meat-packer behavior in the fed 
cattle market; and b) the evolution of the grid pricing mechanism for fed cattle.  Both of these 
literature areas are extensive.  To optimize space the discussion will focus on contributions 
germane to the issues addressed in this study. We direct the reader to Ward (2010) for a review 
of the issues and research on the beef industry’s industrial structure. We suggest Fausti et al. 
(2010) for a discussion of the grid pricing literature.   
Meat-Packer Conduct when Purchasing Fed Cattle 
The meat-packing market-conduct empirical literature can be divided into long and short-run 
behavioral studies. Long-run behavioral studies on the fed cattle market have followed two 
approaches: a) structure-performance (e.g., Menkhaus et al. 1981); and b) conjectural variation 
(e.g., Schroeter 1988). Short-run empirical behavioral studies are based on game theory 
predictions of cooperative versus non-cooperative firm behavior within an oligopoly market 
structure (e.g., Koontz et al. 1993; Koontz and Garcia 1997; Carlberg et al. 2009; Cai et al. 
2011). These studies evaluate changes in packer margins to identify cooperative and non-
cooperative short-run behavior in the slaughter cattle market.  The implication drawn from this 
literature is that oligopsony behavior in the slaughter cattle market is intermittent and the degree 
of market power varies across time.  
 The objective of Cai et al. (2011) is to evaluate the beef packing industry’s fed cattle 
pricing behavior in the pre and post periods associated with implementation of the MPR. They 
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employ a Markov process within a regime switching regression model to identify periods of 
oligopsony behavior.  Their empirical model provides time-period range estimates of 
collaborative versus non-collaborative packer pricing behavior (pp. 614-615). They conclude that 
during the post-MPR period, oligopsony rents were higher during cooperative periods, the 
duration of non-cooperative periods declined, and during non-cooperative periods firms behaved 
competitively. We rely upon the periods identified by Cai et al. (2011) to empirically test if 
packer oligopsony market power affected grid price assessment of carcass quality during 
cooperative periods.  
Carcass Quality Attributes and Grid Price Transmission   
The value based marketing initiative (National Cattlemen's Association: Value Based Marketing 
Taskforce 1990) was the beef industry’s response to declining beef demand. The literature 
indicates that beef demand began to decline in the late 1970s, bottomed in the late 1990s and has 
not fully recovered (Schroeder et al. 1998; Fausti et al. 2010).  The goal of this initiative is to 
increase beef demand by improving the overall quality of beef carcasses; and improve 
production efficiency along the beef supply chain.  Grid pricing of fed cattle is a key component 
in the beef industry’s value based marketing initiative.  The beef industry identified the practice 
of selling fed cattle by the pen at an average price as a significant source of the inconsistency in 
carcass quality and a factor associated with weak beef demand (Fausti et al. 1998).       
 The grid pricing literature has documented that the outcome of selling cattle based on 
individual carcass merits is dependent of carcass quality. Therefore, the per-head grid revenue 
can be either above or below the pen average per-head price when cattle are sold live or dressed 
weight (e.g., Feuz et al. 1993; McDonald and Schroeder 2003). However, Ward (2005) shows 
that packers consistently pay more (less) for high quality cattle when purchased on a grid (live 
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weight by the pen) relative to mid-quality cattle purchased by dressed weight.  Conversely, the 
literature also demonstrates that per-pen revenue variability increases when selling on a grid 
regardless of cattle quality (e.g., Fausti et al. 1998; Schroeder and Graff 2000; Anderson and 
Zeuli 2001; Feuz et al. 1995). 
 A number of studies have investigated the properties of the grid pricing method as a price 
transmission mechanism for market preferences with respect to specific carcass quality attributes 
(Feuz et al. 1993; Feuz 1999; Schroeder and Graff 2000; Fausti and Qasmi 2002; Johnson and 
Ward 2005 and 2006; Faust et al. 2014).  The general consensus of the literature is that grid 
pricing mechanisms do transmit market preferences for carcass quality. However, the grid 
pricing system seems to have a bias toward discounts.  This literature suggests that the incentive 
of grid premiums may not be strong enough to overcome the financial risk associated with grid 
discounts to induce a majority of fed cattle producers to sell their cattle on a grid (Fausti and 
Feuz 1995; Fausti et al. 1998; Fausti and Qasmi 2002; Johnson and Ward 2005 and 2006). Thus, 
it is argued that the discount bias represents a barrier to adoption by producers. In a recent study, 
Fausti et al. (2014) reports empirical evidence that this negative bias is weakening.  
 We extend this literature by empirically estimating the adjustment in grid premiums and 
discounts over time and quantifying their effect on the valuation of carcass quality attributes. To 
our knowledge, the long-run dynamic effect of grid premiums and discounts on individual 
carcass quality attribute valuation has not been addressed in the literature.  
 
Theoretical Background  
We are interested in the long-run economic relationship between carcass quality attributes and 
grid price signals.  We investigate if: a) the grid price mechanism’s premium and discount 
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structure is evolving over time; and b) identified periods of packer oligopsony behavior effect the 
grid pricing mechanism’s valuation of carcass quality.   
 The innovative aspect of this research is the construction of a weekly pooled time-series 
cross-sectional data set that evaluates the grid incentive mechanism using the animal’s assessed 
premium or discount relative to the grid’s base price.  Following the approach of Fausti and 
Qasmi (2002) and Fausti et al. (2014), the unique characteristic of this study is that carcass 
quality characteristics are held constant across time. Thus, market prices are the sole source of 
weekly variation in carcass value. This study differs from the above mentioned studies because 
our data set contains weekly AMS grid estimates for 598 individual steers rather than pen level 
averages.  
Grid Pricing Mechanism  
We adopt an approach followed by Feuz (1999). Feuz’s study is unique because it focuses on the 
animal’s levied premium or discount (pp. 333-34). Feuz’s equation 5 encompasses an individual 
steer carcass’s grid premium or discount per hundred weight. Simplifying Feuz’s equation 5, we 
arrive at Feuz’s “value based price premium” (VBP). We derive our version of VBP following 
the approach discussed in Fausti et al. (1998).  Fausti et al. suggest using the AMS additive grid 
to derive VBP estimates for individual animal dressed weight carcasses.  
 Our extension of the Feuz approach allows us to evaluate a single set of slaughter steers 
over an extended time period. We hypothesize that the influence of the interaction of an animal’s 
carcass quality attributes and a grid’s incentive mechanism on VBP can be revealed by 





Market Power in the Fed Cattle Market 
The second hypothesis to be empirically tested in this study is if there is evidence of oligopsony 
market power in the grid pricing system. Cai et al. (2011) empirically identify periods of 
cooperative and non-cooperative market power in the fed cattle market that has resulted in 
oligopsony rents in the post-MPR period.  Their empirical model is derived from the theoretical 
underpinnings of a branch of the Industrial Organization literature, commonly referred to as the 
“new empirical industrial organization” branch (Calberg et al. 2009).  Cai et al. (2011: pp. 608-
11) presents theoretical and empirical models based on firm behavioral assumptions outlined in 
Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for a multiple player dynamic game.  Cai et al. (2011) use a 
Markov regime switching model to estimate packer margins that provide approximations for 
dating and duration of cooperative and non-cooperative regimes in the fed cattle market (page 
615).   
 To test if market power is affecting a slaughter steer’s VBP; we model the periods 
identified by Cai et al. (2011: Table 3/Figure 2) as cooperative and non-cooperative behavior 
using a simple bivariate dummy variable. It is assumed that the market power price effect varies 
randomly across the 598 steers. The random effects assumption is consistent with the literature’s 
conclusion that oligopsony behavior in the slaughter cattle market is intermittent and the degree 
of market power varies across time. 
 
Data:  
A pooled time series; cross-sectional data set containing carcass information on fed steers 
evaluated weekly on the USDA-AMS publically reported price grid (National Carcass Premiums 
and Discounts for Slaughter Steers and Heifers) was constructed for the years 2001 to 2008.  The 
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carcass data contain carcass characteristics for 598 slaughter steers (see Table 1) collected by the 
Animal Science Department at SDSU as part of a ranch to rail study (Fausti et al. 2003).   
 The price data were collected from USDA weekly grid premium and discount reports.  
We used an additive premium and discount price grid as suggested by Fausti et al. (1998).The 
price data were used to simulate individual animal weekly per head VBP using the AMS price 
grid data from April 2001 to June 2008.  We also collected AMS weekly reported Nebraska 
dressed weight price (35% to 65% choice) to represent the general price level for the slaughter 
cattle market (Nebraska Weekly Direct Slaughter Cattle-Negotiated Purchases (LM_CT158)). 
Price data is combined with individual animal carcass characteristics. A total of 378 weeks of 
price data were simulated. The data set contains 226,044 observations. 
 The dating of meatpacker cooperative versus non-cooperative behavior periods is based 
on estimates of cooperative behavior duration by Cai et al. (2011: page 615-Table 3). Based on 
Cai et. al. (2011) we determined that there were eight cooperative periods that occurred between 
2004 and 2008. These periods are listed in Table 2.  In Table 3, the simple bivariate dummy 
representing cooperative periods (MP) has a mean of 0.548, indicating that during the period of 
our study cooperative regime behavior occurred approximately fifty-five percent of the time.   
   
Empirical Methodology:  
Approach 
A pooled time-series regression model is used to investigate the influence of carcass quality 
characteristics on an individual animal’s premium or discount per hundredweight relative to the 
AMS grid base price. We refer to this levied premium or discount as VBP.  We regress VBP on 
dummy variables reflecting individual steer carcass quality based on categories defined by the 
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AMS grid. We employ quarterly dummy variables to account for seasonality, a time trend 
variable, interaction terms, and the weekly hot carcass dressed weight price. We also employ a 
simple bivariate dummy variable (MP) reflecting periods of packer cooperative versus non-
cooperative behavior.  
 The standard assumptions associated with the linear mixed model (LMM) are listed in 
equations 1-4. Using the standard vector notation provided in the SAS/Stat 9.3 User Guide (SAS 
Institute, 2011), we define the general structure of the model as:  
            1.   𝑉𝐵𝑃 = Χ𝛽 + 𝑍𝛾 +  𝜀, 
     2.    𝛾 ∼ 𝑵(𝑂, 𝐺), 
            3.    𝜀 ∼ 𝑵(𝑂, 𝑅), and  
    4.    𝐶𝑂𝑉(𝛾, 𝜖) = 0. 
The dependent variable (VBP) denotes the vector of dependent variable observations. 
Matrix X is the design matrix associated with β, which represents the vector of unknown fixed 
effects parameters. Matrix Z is the design matrix associated with γ, representing the vector of 
unknown random effects parameters. The error term, ε, reflects an unknown random error vector. 
Equation 4 states that γ and ε are independent, which implies that the variance of VBP (SAS 
Institute, 1999: p. 2087) can be defined as:  
5.   𝑉𝐴𝑅[𝑉𝐵𝑃] = 𝑍𝐺𝑍𝑇 +  𝑅. 1  
Matrices G and R are the covariance matrices associated with γ and ε, respectively. The 
mixed procedure requires the covariance matrices G and R to be specified. We used a variance 
components specification for G and a blocked (subject-dependent) first order autoregressive 
specification for R. These specifications are based on regression diagnostics.   
                                                          
1
 The superscript notation “T” denotes the transpose matrix operation.   
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 A Mixed Effects model that includes both fixed and random effects was selected to 
analyze the data.  Equation 1 provides the general functional form for a Mixed Effects model and 
below is our modified version: 
 6) 𝑉𝐵𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗
8
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖
598
𝑖=1 𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑇𝑡 + ∑ 𝜃𝑘
3
𝑘=1 𝑆𝑖𝑘𝑡 +  ∑ 𝜑𝑗
8
𝑗=1 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑇𝑡 +
𝜔𝑃𝑡 +  𝜌𝑃𝑡𝑇𝑡 + 𝜗𝑀𝑃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 = 1 𝑡𝑜 598, 𝑗 = 1 𝑡𝑜 8, 𝑘 = 1 𝑡𝑜 3, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 = 1 𝑡𝑜 378.    
 For our analysis: a) VBPit denotes the individual animal’s weekly grid determined carcass 
quality attribute valuation (defined in terms of dollars per hundred weight; b) C denotes 
individual animal carcass quality characteristics; c) T denotes the time trend variable; d) S 
denotes the seasonal quarterly dummy variables; e) P denotes the AMS reported Nebraska 
dressed weight price (HCWP); f) MP denotes a fixed effects bivariate dummy variable 
representing cooperative and non-cooperative periods;  and g) Z is the design matrix associated 
with γ i, the random effects parameter estimate, and ε is as defined above.  Subscripts denote 
matrix dimensions: a) subscript i denotes the number of subjects; b) subscript j denotes the 
number of carcass quality dummy variables; c) subscript t denotes the number of time periods; 
and d) subscript k denotes the number of seasonal dummy variables. Parameters α, β, θ, δ, φ, ω, 
ρ, and ϑ represent fixed effects, and γ denotes the random effects parameter estimate.  
Fixed and Random Effects Variables Defined 
Quarterly seasonal dummy variables were constructed with October, November, and December 
designated as the base quarter, along with a weekly time trend variable.  Based on the Cai et al. 
(2011) we constructed a bivariate dummy variable representing packer cooperative (MP=1) 
versus non-cooperative periods (MP=0).  The MP variable was also selected as the random 
effects variable to test the Cai et al. (2011: p.625) conclusion that “…estimates of regime-
dependent variances, p1 and p2, are significant and vary across regimes.” Thus, the MP fixed 
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effects estimate is the average effect across all subjects (steers) and the random effects 
assumption produces unique estimates for individual steers.  
 We included Pt to determine if a change in the market price for slaughter cattle affected 
how the market rewards carcass characteristics over time.  Fausti and Qasmi (2002) hypothesized 
that such a relationship may exist between the HCWP and grid premium and discount levels.  
 Carcass quality variable categories are based on marbling score and kidney/pelvic/heart 
fat measurements and were then converted into dummy variables.  Quality grade categories are 
prime, choice, select, and standard, with choice as the base. Yield grade variable categories are 
yield grade less than 2 (YG1), yield grade between 2 and 3 (YG2), and yield grade of 4 or 
greater (YG45). The yield grade category 3 to 4 is designated as the base.  Heavy weight carcass 
dummy variable (HWT) reflects a carcass with HCW>950 and the light weight carcass dummy 
variable (LWT) reflects a carcass with HCW<600. Interaction terms combining the time trend 
variable with carcass traits are used to determine if there is a trend in the market incentive 
mechanism. HCWP interaction term was included to test if the market price level influence on 
grid premium and discount levels has been changing over time.  Summary statistics for 
exogenous variables are provided in Table 3.   
Model Diagnostics  
The empirical analysis was conducted using SAS version 9.3.  The Mixed Effects model was 
estimated using SAS’s Restricted Maximum Likelihood method. The LMM procedure in SAS 
provides great flexibility  dealing with regression diagnostic issues (SAS Institute, 1999). First, 
we conducted stationary tests for the two continuous variables in our model, VBP and HCWP.  
The Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test (SAS-ETS 1999: p.332) indicated that both variables are 
stationary at a p-value of less than 0.001. 
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Next, we employed a “sandwich estimator” approach to produce robust standard errors 
associated with parameter estimates (SAS Institute, 1999, chapter 41; and Diggle et al., 1994). 
The default covariance structure for the Mixed procedure is variance components (SAS 1999: p. 
2088).
1
 Other covariance structures for G and R were investigated. The variance components 
structure was selected for matrix G, and the autoregressive of order one was selected for matrix 
R. Both covariance structure assumptions were based on the “Null Model Likelihood Ratio 
Test.” We also used the Likelihood Ratio Test to determine if the random effects assumption was 
valid. The test indicated that this assumption is valid at a p-value less than 0.001.  
 
Results:  
Summary statistics presented in Table 3 indicate 52.21% of the 598 carcasses graded choice, 
39.6% graded select, 6.85% graded standard, and 1.34% graded prime. Carcasses receiving a 
yield grade less than 2 accounted for 17.2% of the sample. Yield grade 2 to 3 accounted for 
48.3%, and 6% received a yield grade of 4 or greater. Yield grade 3 to 4 carcasses accounted for 
28.5% of the sample. Carcasses determined to either HWT and LWT accounted for 1% and 2% 
of the carcasses graded, respectively. The per-hundred weight premium/discount variable (VBP) 
averaged -$4.87.  
 The variance components estimating procedure provided evidence that the variance 
associated with matrix G’s contribution to the variance of matrix V (covariance matrix for VBP) 
was significant at the one percent level (Table 4).  Given the statistical significance of the 
random effects covariance parameter estimate and the Likelihood Ratio Test result, we believe 
the mixed model assumption is justified.  
                                                          
1
 The Likelihood Ratio Test indicated that variance components covariance matrix was superior to the OLS diagonal 
covariance structure (σ
2I), were I is the identity matrix.   
13 
 
Overview of Fixed Effects Estimates 
Type 3 tests indicate that all fixed effects variables are statistically significant at a p-value less 
than 0.01. The fixed effects intercept estimate is -$0.84 (Table 5).  This intercept represents the 
industry standard carcass.  The industry standard carcass is the default carcass quality in our 
empirical model. If all of the fixed effect dummy variables are set to their default value, and 
assume t=0 and HCWP =$100, then a quality grade choice, yield grade 3 carcass weighing 
between 600 and 950 will receive: VBP= -$0.84 + $0.63 = -$0.21 per hundred weight. At the 
other end of the time spectrum (t=378), when HCWP is $100 cwt, the VBP for the industry 
standard carcass is estimated at: -$0.84 + $0.63 + $1.46 = $1.25 per hundred weight. These back 
of the envelope calculations suggest that the long-run trend reflected in the grid price signaling 
mechanism is positive for steer carcasses that meet the industry standard. This finding is 
consistent with Fausti et al. (2014).   
 Fit statistics for the LML model are provided in Table 4.  We conclude the fixed effects 
component of the model does explain differences in VBP across individual animals included in 
the data set.  Fixed effects parameter estimates for main and interaction effect variables are 
presented in Table 5.    
Main Effects 
All carcass quality dummy parameter estimates have the expected sign (premium versus 
discount). The parameter values fall within the expected range, given the inclusion of the 
interaction terms.   
 Quarterly seasonal dummy variable parameter estimates indicate that relative to the 
fourth quarter; VBP increases in the first and third quarters, and declines in the second quarter. 
The seasonality estimates are consistent with the literature (e.g., Fausti and Qasmi 2002).  
14 
 
The parameter estimate for HCWP is positive and significant (p<0.001) indicating that while the 
market price for slaughter cattle is not directly related to VBP it does positively influence VBP. 
This finding supports the Supply Response Hypothesis proposed by Fausti and Qasmi (2002: p. 
31).  
 The market power dummy variable (MP) was negative and significant (p<0.001) 
indicating that during cooperative periods VBP declined by approximately $0.50 per 
hundredweight relative to non-cooperative periods.  For a dressed carcass weighing 800 pounds, 
this implies a reduction of four dollars in per head revenue. Our empirical results support 
empirical work of Cai et al. (2001) demonstrating that the packing industry generates oligopsony 
rents in the fed cattle market during cooperative periods. Our contribution to the market structure 
literature is that there is also evidence of oligopsony rents being extracted when slaughter cattle 
are sold on a grid during cooperative periods.   
 Indirect Fixed Effects 
  We created interaction terms between Tt and Cijt, and between Tt and HCWPt. The 
interaction terms indicate that the quality characteristics of Prime and YG1 exhibit a positive 
trend in market value with respect to their influence on VBP over time. The quality 
characteristics of Standard, YG45, and LWT all exhibit a negative trend, suggesting that these 
carcass attributes experienced a deepening of the market discount during the period of the study. 
The carcass attributes of YG2 and HWT both had unexpected signs. The interaction term for 
yield grade 2-3 was negative; indicating the premium paid for this attribute has weakened. The 
interaction term for HWT was positive suggesting this discount category has weakened. The 
parameter estimate for Select carcass interaction term was negative. This suggests that the 
discount on select quality grade carcasses deepened during this period. 
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 Overall, the interaction terms indicate a pattern of intensification across grid discounts 
and premiums. This suggests a strengthening of market signals for specific characteristics.  This 
is especially true with respect to the quality grade versus yield categories. The interaction 
parameter estimates for quality grade categories are an order of magnitude higher than for the 
yield grade categories.  
 The final interaction term estimated was for HCWP. The parameter estimate was 
negative and statistically significant, but the low magnitude suggests the relationship between 
VBP and market price had a significant positive relationship overall. This suggests that the rising 
price of cattle played an important role in the positive change in VBP over the seven year period.  
Overview of Random Effects Estimates 
 We hypothesize that oligopsony market power represents a random effects explanatory 
variable based on the work of Cai et al. (2011).  Using the variance components estimating 
procedure we found that the MP covariance parameter estimate associated with matrix G was 
statistically significant at less than one percent. This supports the supposition that there is 
variability in the level of persistence and intensity of oligopsony market power in the fed cattle 
grid pricing system (Table 4). 
 The random effects option in SAS also produces parameter estimates for γi. The fixed 
effects parameter estimate for MP (-$0.50) represents the average effect of oligopsony behavior 
for the group of 598 head during cooperative periods.
1
 The parameter estimates for γi represent 
the estimated effect of cooperative periods on individual steers. Thus these estimates (not 
reported but summary statistics for γi are reported in Table 1) reflect the marginal adjustment to 
                                                          
1
  The fixed effects parameter estimate for MP represents a shift in the estimated intercept.  The -$0.50 per 
hundredweight is an estimate of oligopsony rent during cooperative periods relative to non-cooperative 
periods. Cai et al. (2011: p. 614) concluded that during non-cooperative periods in the post MPR period 
packers behaved competitively.   
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fixed effect parameter estimate for MP due to differences in carcass quality attributes across the 
598 steers.   
 To gain insight on how cooperative periods affect the grid premium and discount 
structure we ran an auxiliary OLS regression. We regressed the γi parameter estimates on the 
carcass quality attribute dummy variables; Cij. We employed a simple OLS model that is defined 
in equation 7 (SAS Ver. 9.3):  
7)  𝛾𝑖 =  𝛼 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗
8
𝑗=1
𝐶𝑖𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖, 𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 = 1 𝑡𝑜 598. 
We tested for multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) estimates 
are all less than 2.  However, heteroscedasticity was detected and a White correction procedure 
was implemented to generate Heteroscedasticity Consistent-Standard Errors (White 1980, p. 
822).  We also generate and report partial R-square estimates (Table 6).  
 All of the explanatory variables were statistically significant and negative, except prime 
and YG1 were positive (Table 6). The estimated intercept ($0.41) represents the adjustment to 
the fixed effect (MP) parameter estimate for an industry standard carcass (Choice, YG3, 600-950 
lbs.). This estimate suggests that packers did extract $0.09 per hundredweight in oligopsony rent 
during cooperative periods from carcasses meeting the industry quality standard. The positive 
coefficient for prime ($0.05) suggests that even prime carcasses were subject to a small 
oligopsony rent ($0.04) during the period covered in this study.  This is surprising given that 
only a very small percentage of carcasses grade prime and this carcass attribute is primarily 
purchased by white tablecloth restaurants; a very competitive niche market.   
 Parameter estimates for yield grade characteristics are statistically significant. Only the 
YG1 had a positive parameter estimate. This suggests that both yield grade premiums and 
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discounts experienced downward pressure during cooperative periods. Both the LWT and HWT 
discounts were also negatively affected during cooperative periods.  
 Parameter estimates for select and standard carcasses indicate that quality grade discounts 
experienced the greatest pricing pressure during cooperative periods. During cooperative periods 
the select and standard grade category discounts deepened by $0.87 and $0.88 per 
hundredweight, respectively.  In addition the partial R-square estimates indicate that select and 
standard grade categories explained eighty and nineteen percent of the variability in γi, 
respectively (table 6).  This finding is consistent with literature on importance of the 
choice/select spread in a grid pricing system (e.g. Ward and Johnson 2005).  The remaining 
variables, combined, contribute less than one percent to the model’s R-square. 
 The empirical evidence suggests that during cooperative periods, packing firms extracted 
oligopsony rent primarily through the grid discount structure. Within the grid discount structure, 
oligopsony rent was extracted primarily from the carcass quality grade discount categories.  The 
empirical evidence further suggests that oligopsony pricing power focused primarily on the grid 
discount structure lends credence to a general complaint raised by producers that the grid system 
is a pricing system of discounts only (e.g., Fausti et al. 1998; Johnson and Ward 2005).   
 
Discussion:  
 A long-run empirical analysis investigated the grid pricing system’s ability to convey 
market signals, and if meatpackers exerted oligopsony pricing in the slaughter cattle market for 
cattle sold on a grid.  With respect to the transmission of market signals, we adopted an approach 
suggested by Feuz (1999). Empirical evidence suggests that, on average, a pattern of 
intensification across grid discounts and premiums has occurred over time. This trend has led to 
18 
 
a general improvement in the market valuation of carcass quality attributes for the 598 steers 
included in this study that meet the industry standard for carcass quality. This positive trend 
suggests the barriers to grid price adoption are weakening over time, but the grid discount 
structure continues to be an issue.  
 The second objective focused on oligopsony market power in the slaughter cattle market. 
The work of Cai et al. (2011) was extended by adopting their empirical duration estimates of 
cooperative meatpacker behavior. We incorporated identified periods of cooperative behavior 
into the empirical model to test if oligopsony market power affected an individual steer’s carcass 
premium and discount.  The empirical results indicate that indeed, during periods of cooperative 
behavior, packers extracted oligopsony rents primarily through the deepening of carcass quality 
discounts. Thus, one could argue that oligopsony behavior during cooperative periods could pose 
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Table 1.  Cattle Quality Characteristics and γi Estimates: 598 OBS   
Variable
1 
N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
HCW 598 743.186 74.246 579.000 991.000 
Dress 598 60.683 2.081 53.086 69.700 
REA 598 12.548 1.437 8.100 20.300 
FT 598 0.433 0.175 0.100 1.100 
KPH 598 1.866 0.598 0.500 3.500 
Marb 598 493.094 91.653 340.000 830.000 
YG 598 2.746 0.751 0.564 5.237 
QG 598 2.520 0.644 1.000 4.000 
γi 598 0.003 0.475 -0.814 0.5499 
1.  Variable acronyms: a) HCW is hot carcass weight; b) Dress is animal 
dressing percentage; c)  REA is rib-eye area; d) FT denotes fat thickness 
over the 7
th
 rib; e) KPH is kidney-pelvic-heart fat measurement; f) MARB 
is marbling score; g) YG denotes USDA yield grade score; h) QG is USDA 
yield grade score; and i) denotes the OLS parameter estimate for the effect 





Table 2.  Beef Packing Industry Cooperative Time Periods 
Cooperative Period Period (weeks) Start Date End Date 
  MP1 0<weeks<39 04/09/01 12/26/01 
  MP2 53<weeks<81 04/15/02 10/14/02 
  MP3 106<weeks<150 04/21/03 02/09/04 
  MP4 157<weeks<168 04/12/04 06/21/04 
  MP5 206<weeks<220 03/21/05 06/13/05 
  MP6 241<weeks<283 11/21/05 08/28/06 
  MP7 299<weeks<324 01/01/07 06/18/07 




Table 3.  Summary Statistics: VBP Data Set 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
VBP (dependent) 226044 -4.868 6.780 -44.430 15.280 
QS1 226044 0.238 0.426 0.000 1.000 
QS2 226044 0.272 0.445 0.000 1.000 
QS3 226044 0.243 0.429 0.000 1.000 
Time 226044 189.500 109.119 1.000 378.000 
Prime 226044 0.013 0.115 0.000 1.000 
Choice 226044 0.522 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Select 226044 0.396 0.489 0.000 1.000 
Standard 226044 0.069 0.253 0.000 1.000 
YG1 226044 0.172 0.378 0.000 1.000 
YG2 226044 0.483 0.500 0.000 1.000 
YG45 226044 0.060 0.238 0.000 1.000 
HWT 226044 0.010 0.100 0.000 1.000 
LWT 226044 0.022 0.146 0.000 1.000 
HCWP 226044 131.314 15.887 97.800 172.460 
MP 226044 0.548 0.497 0.000 1.000 





Table 4.  Variance Components Statistics and LML 
Model Fit Statistics 
Covariance 
Parameter   
Covariance Parameter 
Estimate & Z statistic 
  MP 0.2157: Z=14.28 
 AR(1) 0.9626: Z=1688.4 
 Residual 8.3747: Z=65.72 
LML Fit Statistics   
 -2 Log Likelihood 534260.7 
 AIC 534266.7 




ICCMP = 2.26% 
ICCAR1 = 10.08% 
Likelihood Ratio 
Test: Unrestricted 
Model (Mixed Effects 
MP) Versus 
Restricted Model 
(Fixed Effects MP) 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
Statistic=1784.8   

















Table 5.  VBP REML Fixed Effects Parameter Estimates  
Variable DF Estimate Std. Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 23K -0.8389 0.0663 -12.66 < .0001 
QS1 23K 0.1526 0.0082 18.55 < .0001 
QS2 23K -0.2092 0.0099 -21.03 < .0001 
QS3 23K 0.1999 0.0088 22.80 < .0001 
Time 23K 0.0039 0.0004 9.27 < .0001 
Prime 23K 4.7287 0.0540 87.51 < .0001 
Select 23K -7.9377 0.0256 -310.52 < .0001 
Standard 23K -16.7322 0.2711 -61.72 < .0001 
Yg1 23K 2.7584 0.0467 60.39 < .0001 
Yg2 23K 1.5183 0.0189 80.14 < .0001 
Yg45 23K -13.3550 0.2246 -59.47 < .0001 
HWT 23K -9.1095 0.0640 -142.37 < .0001 
LWT 23K -3.5585 0.9774 -3.64 0.0003 
HCWP 23K 0.0063 0.0006 11.18 < .0001 
Time*Prime 23K 0.0167 0.0001 259.74 < .0001 
Time*Select 23K -0.0036 0.0001 -85.52 < .0001 
Time*standard 23K -0.0029 0.0001 -31.81 < .0001 
Time*Yg1 23K 0.0004 0.0001 5.85 < .0001 
Time*Yg2 23K -0.0006 0.0001 -13.72 < .0001 
Time*Yg45 23K -0.0010 0.0001 -16.96 < .0001 
Time*HWT 23K 0.0132 0.0001 173.06 < .0001 
Time*LWT 23K -0.0008 0.0003 -3.08 0.0021 
Time*HCWP 23K -0.00003 0.0001 -9.90 < .0001 




Table 6.  OLS Estimates of MP Random Effects Coefficient Model 
Variable DF Estimate Std Error t Value Pr > |t| Partial R
2 
Intercept 1 0.4071 0.0016 249.28 < .0001  
Prime 1 0.0465 0.0073 6.35 < .0001 0.0002 
Select 1 -0.8729 0.0020 -448.73 < .0001 0.7992 
Standard 1 -0.7781 0.0036 -215.73 < .0001 0.1925 
Yg1 1 0.0413 0.0029 14.51 < .0001 0.0019 
Yg2 1 -0.0167 0.0021 -8.03 < .0001 0.0003 
Yg45 1 -0.1019 0.0038 -27.08 < .0001 0.0030 
LWT 1 -0.0105 0.0058 -1.81 0.0715 0.0000 
HWT 1 -0.1033 0.0084 -12.27 < .0001 0.0006 
Model: DF=8, Sum of Sqs=106.5184, Mean Sq=13.3148, F value=31836.8, Pr> F <.0001 
Error:  DF=589,  Sum of Sqs=0.2463,  Mean Sq=0.0004 
Root MSE=0.02005,  R
2
=0.9977 
 
 
